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SENSITIVE
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NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
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SUBJECT: SRSG ANGELO ON CHAD-SUDAN, CHAD REBELS, AND DIS
SUCCESSES

REF: NDJAMENA 355

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told Ambassador August 31 that he had taken the initiative to engage with the GOC on Chad-Sudan normalization issues and had presented the GOC with a list of graduated confidence building measure, which Sudan SRSG Adada also would present to the GOS. Angelo said that he estimated that some 1,000 Chad rebels had returned to Chad since last year, not the 3,000-5,000 the GOC claimed, but still a substantial number. The SRSG also said that he expected to sign a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the GOC before long, as soon as contentious but not insurmountable tax issues had been resolved and that the DIS, with UNPOL support and with GOC security apparatus cooperation, were proving increasingly effective, for which he cited examples. Angelo reiterated his desire to see the U.S.military advisors on the MINURCAT staff increase from two to eight and promised to ensure that the request was implemented expeditiously.

¶2. (SBU) Angelo said that his main interlocutor with the GOC on Chad-Sudan was FORMIN Faki, whom he described as the most intelligent of President Deby's close advisors; "the only one who could tell Deby things he might not want to hear," and "the only one who knew how to put into words that Deby could understand" such otherwise unpalatable issues and facts. Even so, it would be difficult to move the GOC to action vis-a-vis Sudan, because no one was yet willing to "champion" the idea of Chad-Sudan normalization as a strategic GOC goal.

¶3. (SBU) It is very good news, we judge, that the SRSG is getting involved in the Chad-Sudan normalization issue and we will try to support his efforts, as they parallel those of SE Gration and the USG in general. Angelo's most urgent problems continue to be with his PKO bureaucracies in New York rather than with Chadian authorities, with whom he continues to build relationships of confidence and trust. Even the GOC's still-limited willingness to engage with the SRSG on Chad-Sudan normalization reflects its increasing comfort-level with Angelo as well as an alternative the engaging with the AU, which the GOC considers unreliable, pro-Sudan, and Arab-oriented. END SUMMARY.

MINURCAT TAKES ON
CHAD-SUDAN ISSUES

14. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador August 31 that he had taken the initiative to engage with the GOC on Chad-Sudan normalization issues and had presented the GOC with a list of "graduated" confidence building measures, which SRSG Adada also would present to the GOS; more substantial measures, such as border monitoring, would follow. Angelo outlined some of them: Cessation of propaganda, opening of border points, low-level cross-border "visits," for instance, were modest first steps. Angelo said that his PKO's involvement with the Chad-Sudan problem was the result of the approval of his Strategic Plan that included promoting "political dialogue" between Chad and Sudan. Such promotion would contribute to MINURCAT's mandate to protect civilians in eastern Chad and would require no additional resources of any kind.

15. (SBU) Angelo told Ambassador that his main interlocutor with the GOC was FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat, whom he described as the most intelligent of President Deby's close advisors; "the only one who could tell Deby things he might not want to hear," and "the only one who knew how to put into words that Deby could understand" such otherwise unpalatable issues and facts. Even so, Angelo said it would be difficult to move the GOC to action vis-a-vis Sudan, because no one was yet willing to "champion" the idea of Chad-Sudan normalization as a strategic GOC goal. Ambassador suggested that Angelo consider approaching National Mediator Abderamane Moussa, who, as a trusted "wise man" without further political ambitions, might play a useful role in bringing

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things to Deby's attention and recommending irenic courses of action. Angelo said he would arrange to talk to the National Mediator.

CHAD REBELS

16. (SBU) Angelo said that he estimated that some 1,000 Chad rebels had returned to Chad since last year, not the 3,000-5,000 the GOC claimed, but still a substantial number. Angelo said that he knew that the GOS had not permitted Ahmat Soubiane to return to Sudan. The SRSG said that he understood that substantial numbers of Chad rebels had relocated deeper inside Sudan and away from the Chad border but did not know if they did so on their own initiative or under Sudanese Government supervision.

DIS INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE

17. (SBU) Angelo said that the DIS, with UNPOL support and with GOC security apparatus cooperation, were proving increasingly effective. He cited the DIS officer publicly decorated last week by MINURCAT for superior achievement. The DIS officer had lost a leg successfully defending an NGO ambulance from heavily-armed bandit attack. Angelo said that MINURCAT had begun to form "task forces" consisting of DIS, UNPOL, and GOC security personnel, to attack specific problems. Angelo cited the success of one such team in re-apprehending two rapists who had escaped from custody. He said that another team was focused on foiling the efforts of a band of "refugee bandits" operating out of refugee camps near Goz Beida.

SOMA AND MORE U.S. MILADS

18. (SBU) The SRSG also said that he expected to sign a

Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the GOC before long, as soon as contentious but not insurmountable tax issues had been resolved. Angelo pronounced his basic relationship with the GOC as "very good" and "very constructive," despite the inevitable relatively minor obstacles that had to be overcome along the way. "Sometimes in situations like this, he said, "you just have to be patient." Angelo reiterated his desire to see the U.S. military advisors on the MINURCAT staff increase from two to eight and promised to ensure that the request was implemented expeditiously. He added that the slots for all eight were already planned and carefully calculated to give the U.S. MILADs insight into all areas of the MINURCAT force's operations.

COMMENT

¶9. (SBU) It is very good news, we judge, that the SRSG is getting involved in the Chad-Sudan normalization issue and we will try to support his efforts, as they parallel those of SE Gration and the USG in general. We continue to support the assignment of more U.S. MILADs to MINURCAT staff. Angelo's most pressing problems continue to be with his PKO bureaucracies in New York, rather than with Chadian authorities, with whom he continues to build relationships of confidence and trust. Even the GOC's still-limited willingness to engage with the SRSG on Chad-Sudan normalization reflects its increasing comfort-level with Angelo as well as an alternative the engaging with the AU, which the GOC considers unreliable, pro-Sudan, and Arab-oriented.

¶10. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO